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Suppose the gods create either one person or two people (in succession). You find yourself newly created, and with no reason to prefer the one-person hypothesis H1 to the two-person hypothesis H2, so you assign them each a credence of 1/2. The gods now tell you that you are the first person created; call this evidence E1. You reason as follows: If H1 is true, then I was bound to be the first person created, whereas if H2 is true it was equally likely that I would be the second person created. That is, P(E1|H1) = 1 and P(E1|H2) = 1/2. Then by a simple application of Bayes’ theorem, P(H1|E1) = 2/3 and P(H2|E1) = 1/3. That is, the evidence that I am the first person created confirms H1 over H2. This is the reasoning at the heart of the Doomsday Argument – the argument that knowledge of one’s birth rank confirms shorter survival times for the human species over longer ones (Bradley and Fitelson 2003).
	But the foregoing reasoning fails to take into account the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle (Elga 2000). Recall that in that case, when Beauty wakes, her credence that the coin came up heads shifts to 1/3, even though she believes the coin to be fair. This shift occurs because there are twice as many temporal locations she could occupy in the tails world (Monday or Tuesday) than in the heads world (Monday only), and one can apply a ‘highly restricted principle of indifference’ to infer that each location should be assigned the same credence (Elga 2000:144). When Beauty subsequently learns that it is Monday, conditionalizing on this information exactly undoes the shift, and restores her credence in heads to 1/2.
	The same considerations apply here. When you find yourself newly created, you realize that there are twice as many personal locations you could occupy in the H2 world (first person or second person) than in the H1 world (first person only). This shifts your credence in H1 to 1/3 and H2 to 2/3, despite the fact that you regard the H1 world and the H2 world as intrinsically equiprobable. Then when you learn that you are the first person, conditionalizing on this information exactly undoes the shift, restoring your credence in H1 to its intrinsic value of 1/2.
	The same goes for the full Doomsday Argument. Suppose you have a uniform prior credence distribution over a number of hypotheses for the duration of the human species. When you reflect on your own location in that duration, you realize that worlds with a long-lived human species contain more possible self-locations than worlds with a short-lived human species, and this shifts your credence in favor of hypotheses of a long duration. If you learn that your own birth rank is 1, conditionalizing on this information exactly counteracts this shift, and restores your credences to their uniform prior values. If you learn that your birth rank is k > 1, conditionalizing on this information eliminates those hypotheses with a human population less than k, and restores a uniform credence distribution over the remaining hypotheses.
	More formally, let Hi be the hypothesis that there are i humans in total. Suppose your prior credence distribution is P(Hi) = 1/n for 1  i  n and zero otherwise. The world in which Hi is true contains i possible self-locations, and all the possible worlds together contain s = 1 + 2 + … + n locations. Hence applying Elga’s restricted indifference principle yields P(Hi) = i/s. Suppose you subsequently learn that your birth rank is 1 (evidence E1). By Bayes’ theorem, P(Hi|E1) = P(Hi)P(E1|Hi) / P(E1), where P(E1) = P(H1)P(E1|H1) + P(H2)P(E1|H2) + … + P(Hn)P(E1|Hn) = (1/s)(1) + (2/s)(1/2) + … + (n/s)(1/n) = n/s. So P(Hi|E1) = (i/s)(1/i)(s/n) = 1/n. That is, learning that your birth rank is 1 undoes the self-location shift, and restores your uniform prior. Suppose instead that you learn that your birth rank is k > 1; call this evidence Ek. Now P(Ek) = (k/s)(1/k) + ((k + 1)/s)(1/(k + 1)) + … + (n/s)(1/n) = (n – k)/s. Hence P(Hi|Ek) = 0 for i < k, and P(Hi|Ek) = (i/s)(1/i)(s/(n – k)) = 1/(n – k) for i  k. Again, this restores a uniform credence distribution over the remaining hypotheses.
I have (thus far) taken the ‘thirder’ solution to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle for granted, and argued that parallel reasoning shows that the Doomsday Argument has no force. Dieks (2007) makes a closely related point; he argues independently that the Doomsday Argument has no force, and then shows that parallel reasoning yields the thirder solution to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle. A ‘halfer’ concerning Sleeping Beauty will be unimpressed by the argument so far; indeed, Dieks concedes that halfers ‘should therefore also subscribe to the doomsayer’s conclusion that Doom Soon is imminent’ (2007, 437). However, I think this concession is too hasty; an argument of Pisaturo (2009) can be adapted to show that the Doomsday Argument should have no force for the halfer either.
	To that end, consider the same case as before: The gods create either one person or two people (in succession), and since you have no reason to prefer the one-person hypothesis H1 to the two-person hypothesis H2, you assign each a credence of 1/2. You find yourself newly created, and realize that there are twice as many personal locations you might occupy under H2 than under H1; but as a halfer, you hold that this self-location information should have no effect on your credences in H1 and H2 (Lewis 2001). Then the gods tell you that you are the first person created (evidence E1). Since P(E1|H1) = 1 and P(E1|H2) = 1/2, a simple application of Bayes’ theorem yields P(H1|E1) = 2/3 and P(H2|E1) = 1/3. That is, the evidence that I am the first person created confirms H1 and disconfirms H2; a smaller total number of people is confirmed over a larger total number.
The reasoning generalizes straightforwardly to greater numbers of people, and suggests that information about one’s birth rank confirms smaller total human populations over larger ones. On this basis, the advocate of the Doomsday Argument goes on to conclude that one can expect a shorter future for the human race rather than a longer one (e.g. Bradley and Fitelson 2003, 24). But as Pisaturo (2009, 86–87) points out, confirmation of smaller total populations is not equivalent to confirmation of smaller future populations.
The present example shows this quite nicely. Consider the hypotheses D1, that you are the last person to be created, and D2, that you are the second-last person to be created. For D2 to be true, it must be the case that H2 is true (there are two people) and E1 is true (you are the first of them). Hence when you find yourself newly created, P(D2) = P(H2 & E1) = P(H2)P(E1|H2) = 1/4. Similarly, for D1 to be true, it must be the case that either H1 is true (there is just one person), or H2 is true and E1 is false (there are two people, and you are not the first of them). Hence when you find yourself newly created, P(D1) = P(H1) + P(H2 & ~E1) = P(H1) + P(H2)P(~E1|H2) = 3/4.
	How does learning E1 shift your credences in D1 and D2? Clearly P(E1|D2) = 1, since D2 entails E1. Furthermore, P(E1|D1) = P(E1 & D1) / P(D1) = P(H1) / P(D1) = 2/3. A simple application of Bayes’ theorem yields P(D1|E1) = 2/3 and P(D2|E1) = 1/3. That is, the evidence that I am the first person confirms D2 and disconfirms D1; a longer future is confirmed over a shorter one. This is despite the fact that a smaller total population is confirmed by the same evidence. This might look paradoxical, but there is no mystery here; although E1 confirms the small total population over the larger one, E1 also entails that if the population is the larger one, you must be at the beginning of it, and hence the future is long.
	On the other hand, if the gods tell you that you are the second person created (evidence E2), this evidence eliminates H1 and D2 as possibilities, and drives your credences in H2 and D1 to 1. That is, E2 fully confirms both the larger population and the shorter future. But again, there is no mystery here; if you are the second person created, you must be at the end of the larger population, so the future is short.
	Hence advocates of the Doomsday Argument are faced with a dilemma. If they accept the thirder position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank has no effect on one’s credences concerning the survival of the human species. If they accept the halfer position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank may confirm smaller total human populations over larger ones, but this is not equivalent to confirmation of a shorter future for humanity, and in fact the same evidence may confirm longer future human survival over shorter. ​[1]​
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^1	  I thank Ronald Pisaturo for the discussion that led to the second half of this note, and for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
